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Abstract. It is well known that vertical integration can change an upstream produc-
er’s incentive to supply the integrated …rm’s downstream rivals. However, it has not
been noticed that vertical integration also changes these rivals’ incentives to choose
suppliers. This paper develops an equilibrium theory of vertical merger that incor-
porates strategic behaviors in the input market of both the integrated …rm and the
(downstream) rivals. Under fairly general conditions, vertical mergers will result in
both e¢ciency gains and a collusive e¤ect, and a familiar measure concerning product
di¤erentiation can be used to evaluate whether a vertical merger tends to bene…t or
harm consumers.
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11. INTRODUCTION
An important issue in economics and antitrust is how vertical mergers a¤ect com-
petition. The traditional market foreclosure theory, which was accepted in leading
court cases in 1950s-70s, viewed vertical merger as harming competition by denying
competitors access to either a supplier or a buyer.1 The foreclosure theory has re-
ceived strong criticism from authors that are commonly associated with the Chicago
School. The critics argue that the theory is logically ‡awed, and a vertically inte-
grated …rm cannot bene…t from excluding its rivals (e.g., Bork, 1978; and Posner,
1976). The Chicago School view led to a new perspective in which vertical mergers
were generally considered to be competitively neutral or pro-competitive and to more
favorable treatment to vertical mergers in antitrust in the 1980s (Riordan and Salop,
1995)2.
More recently, a new school of thought has emerged that has shed new light on the
issue of the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. This post-Chicago approach, as is
called by Riordan and Salop, combines the economic analysis of the Chicago School
with the newer methodology of modern industrial organization theory. Focusing on
oligopoly market structures, this new analysis has shown how the logical di¢culty in
the traditional foreclosure theory can be resolved and how vertical mergers can lead to
anticompetitive e¤ects in some situations. A fundamental insight of this approach is
that vertically integrated …rms will have di¤erent incentives from nonintegrated ones
in competing in the input (upstream) market. An integrated …rm will recognize that
it can bene…t from the higher costs imposed on its downstream rivals when it refrains
from competing aggressively in the input market, and it will thus try to do so to raise
1See, for example, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US 294 (1962), and Ford Motor Co v.
United States, 286 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
2The pro-competitive e¤ect of vertical mergers can arise due to, for instance, eliminating double
markup or avoiding ine¢cient input substitution. See Perry (1989) for a survey of the literature.
2the rivals’ costs. Vertical foreclosure can therefore arise in equilibrium. The paper by
Salop and Sche¤man (1987) forms the basis for this argument, and Ordover, Saloner,
and Salop (1990, hereinafter OSS) is perhaps the best-known paper that pioneered
the equilibrium approach to the analysis of vertical mergers.3
In this paper, I shall argue that the new theories on vertical mergers have ignored
an important point, namely that vertical integration not only changes the integrated
…rm’s incentive to supply inputs to its downstream rivals, but it may also change
the rivals’ incentives to purchase inputs from alternative suppliers. Once this is re-
alized, an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers can be developed without some of
the controversial assumptions made in the literature, and this theory can provide
a framework in which the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers are measured and
compared. The basic insight of my analysis is that vertical integration creates mul-
timarket interaction between the integrated …rm and its downstream rivals. A rival
may recognize that if it purchases inputs from the integrated …rm, the integrated …rm
may have less incentive to cut prices in the downstream market, which will bene…t
the rival. Therefore, vertical integration can change the incentive of a downstream
rival in selecting its input supplier, making it a strategic instead of a passive buyer
in the input market.
I consider a model where two di¤erentiated downstream …rms use a homogeneous
input produced by two or more upstream …rms: In the upstream industry, one …rm
m a yb em o r ee ¢ c i e n tt h a no t h e r s ,i nt h es e n s et h a ti t sc o n s t a n tm a r g i n a lc o s t( m1)
is lower than the others’ (m). The downstream …rms can …rst bid to acquire an up-
stream producer, and the remaining independent downstream …rm can counter the
merger by integrating with another upstream producer. The upstream producers (in-
cluding possibly an integrated …rm) then make simultaneous price o¤ers to supply
to any remaining independent downstream …rm(s), which are either accepted or re-
3Other important contributions include Salinger (1988), and Hart and Tirole (1990).
3jected; and afterwards the downstream market prices are set. As it will become more
clear later, this formulation follows closely the approach in OSS, but with several im-
portant di¤erences. First, in the model here the integrated …rm does not have more
commitment power than an unintegrated upstream …rm in setting upstream prices.
This avoids a major criticism to OSS.4 Second, I allow the possibility that one of
the upstream producers is more e¢cient, while in OSS all upstream producers have
identical constant marginal cost. Third, I allow an unintegrated downstream …rm to
behave strategically in choosing input suppliers, while in OSS it is implicitly assumed
that it will always purchase from the supplier with the lowest price.
Our main result is that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium if and only if m1 <m
(i.e., one of the upstream producers is more e¢cient than the others). When m1 <m ;
a downstream …rm will integrate with the more e¢cient upstream …rm; and the
integrated …rm may be able to sell input to the unintegrated downstream …rm at a
price higher than m: To see how this occurs, suppose that the integrated …rm and the
independent upstream …rm(s) all o¤er input price m to the independent downstream
…rm, as if they are Bertrand competitors in the input market (which would be the
outcome if no vertical integration had occurred). The independent downstream …rm
will strictly prefer to accept the o¤er to purchase from the integrated …rm, since the
latter will then have less incentive to cut prices in the downstream market, knowing
that its upstream pro…t will be reduced if its downstream rival decreases sales. This
then enables the integrated …rm to raise the input price to its downstream rival above
m. On the other hand, as it turns out, when m1 = m; the integrated …rm will not be
4The foreclosure result in the OSS model has been criticized for relying on the integrated …rm’s
additional commitment ability and otherwise the result would not be an equilibrium (Hart and
Tirole, 1990; and Rei¤en, 1992). In response, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1992) argued that
vertical foreclosure can be an equilibrium without commitment in OSS if the competition in the
upstream market is modeled as a certain bidding game.
4able to raise the input cost of the downstream rival.
Thus, vertical merger can cause market foreclosure by raising the rival’s cost. Iron-
ically, this happens not because the integrated …rm will refrain from supplying the
rival, but rather because the integrated …rm will continue to supply to the rival. This
result may appear surprising and even counter-intuitive at …rst glance, but it can
become easier to understand if one realizes that …rms may compete less aggressively
if they are also customers/suppliers to each other. The market foreclosure in our
model is thus a consequence of tacit collusion by the integrated …rm and its down-
stream rival.5 However, such market foreclosure need not raise prices in the …nal
market, since vertical merger can occur in equilibrium if and only if it results in
an e¢ciency gain, which can be due to either the elimination of a double markup
when a downstream …rm merges with a more e¢cient upstream …rm or the direct
e¢ciency gain when a vertical merger reduces the marginal cost of production in the
upstream industry. Therefore, vertical mergers will involve both e¢ciency and collu-
sive e¤ects, and this trade-o¤ is a direct consequence of our result concerning when
equilibrium vertical mergers occur. We …nd that there is a simple and familiar mea-
sure to evaluate whether a vertical merger is pro- or anticompetitive: it tends to be
procompetitive when the products of the downstream …rms are highly di¤erentiated
and anticompetitive when these products are close substitutes.
It is quite common for a vertically integrated …rm to continue to supply inputs
to its downstream rivals. Although no formal model in the literature has explored
the collusive incentives identi…ed here, concerns about them have been raised by
government agencies in evaluating vertical mergers. In March 1998, for instance,
the US Department of Justice challenged Lockheed Martin’s proposed acquisition
5Notice that no explicit transfer payments are needed/involved here. It is the multimarket
interaction generated by the vertical merger that can support collusive behavior as an equilibrium
outcome in a non-cooporative game.
5of Northrop, alleging among other things that the merged …rm and Boeing would
be “teamed in virtually every military aircraft currently in production” and that
such “increased interdependence” may lead to reduced competition (Morse, 1998).
The proposed merger was eventually abandoned.6 The point of this paper, however,
goes beyond to show that such concerns may have theoretical merit, in a rather
unanticipated way; it also shows that such possible collusive e¤ect of a vertical merger
will necessarily be accompanied by an e¢ciency e¤ect, and economic analysis can help
determine how on balance consumers will be a¤ected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describers the details of our
model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium of the model and establishes the main result
of the paper. Section 4 studies the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. Section 5
discusses alternative assumptions and robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Two (downstream) …rms, D1 and D2, produce di¤erentiated products.7 The de-
mand functions for their products are qi(p1;p 2); where pi is Di0s price, i =1 ;2: The
production in the downstream industry, D; requires an input that is produced in an
upstream industry, U.T h e r e a r e h ¸ 2 upstream producers, U1, U2,...,Uh,p r o -
ducing a homogeneous input for the downstream industry. The constant marginal
cost of production for U1 is m1; and that for the other upstream …rms is m; where
0 · m1 · m: Thus U1 may have a cost advantage relative to other upstream …rms.8
6Similar concerns have been raised in some of the other recent vertical merger cases. For instance,
in 1995, FTC challenged the proposed acqusition of PCS Health Systems by Eli Lilly, alleging among
other things that “as a result of Lilly’s contact through PCS with other pharmaceutical companies,
collusion would be facilitated.” (Morse, 1998).
7Our results will extend to situations where there are more than two downstream …rms. Consid-
ering only two downstream …rms makes the analysis tractable.
8If h =2and m = m1; this setting would be similar to the basic model in OSS.
6Our analysis would not change if U1:::;Uh all have constant marginal cost m but
a vertical merger between a …rm in D and U1 reduces the integrated …rm’s marginal
cost in U from m to m1. Thus the model can be equivalently viewed as one where
a vertical merger may lead to a cost reduction. To keep the exposition as concise as
possible, I will talk about this alternative interpretation only when necessary.
There is a …xed-coe¢cient technology such that each unit of output in D requires
o n eu n i to fi n p u tf r o mU. The cost of other inputs in D is normalized to 0 (thus the
…rms in D are symmetric).
To develop an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers, we follow OSS and consider
a game with the following stages. Stage 1: downstream …rms can bid to acquire
U1. When a vertical acquisition occurs, we assume, without loss of generality, that
it is conducted by D1 and the integrated …rm is called F: Stage 2: D2 can counter
the merger of D1 and U1; if there is one, by a merger with an unintegrated U …rm,
say, U2: Stage 3: upstream producers simultaneously make price o¤ers to supply all
the input a downstream …rm will purchase, and each downstream …rm either accept
one of the o¤ers or reject all of them. Thus, input prices and the identity of the
supplier(s) are determined at this stage.9 Stage 4: downstream …rms simultaneously
choose prices, given input prices and the identities of …rms in U that would actually
supply D: To avoid trivial situations, we assume that if …rms are indi¤erent between
merger or no merger, they choose no merger, as would be the case if mergers involve
(e.g. legal) costs. Figure 1 illustrates the game.
(Insert Figure 1 about here.)
The major di¤erence here from OSS is that no additional commitment power is
given to F; and the identity of the supplier may matter:10 I nO S St h et h i r ds t a g e
9For a vertically integrated …rm, we assume that the internal input transfer price will be set at
the e¢cient level, which is the marginal cost of the upstream division.
10In OSS, it is assumed that F is able to …rst commit to a price higher than m,w h i c ht h e ne n a b l e s
7is actually before the counter-merger stage. But since price changes are likely to be
easier to make than organizational changes, we place the counter-merger stage earlier,
as is in Hart and Tirole. We incorporate the idea that the identity of suppliers may
matter to a downstream …rm by assuming that it chooses its supplier at stage 3,
before the downstream prices are determined. This amounts to assuming that parties
can use requirement contracts at stage 3. This seems a natural assumption, albeit
a strong one, in the context of our model. As it will become clear shortly, it can
be mutually bene…cial for the vertically integrated …rm and its downstream rival to
establish a supplier/customer relationship before determining downstream prices, and
it seems likely that they will …nd a way to do so. A requirement contract is a simple
way to achieve this in our static model, without involving any transfer payments. We
shall later discuss the robustness of our results if contracting is not allowed and only
spot transaction can be conducted in the upstream market.11
As in OSS, we assume that the demand functions for the two products in D are
symmetric, namely q1(a;b)=q2(b;a):
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we …rst consider the downstream market
in isolation without modeling its strategic interaction with the upstream market.
Suppose that D1 and D2 have marginal costs c1 and c2. Their pro…ts then are
¼i =( pi ¡ ci)qi(p1;p 2);i =1 ;2:




+ qi(p1;p 2)=0 ;i =1 ;2; (1)
U2 to raise the price sold to D2; causing market foreclosure. This assumption has been a source of
much controversy.
11Our result concerning equilibrium vertical mergers will still be valid with this change to our
model, but the e¢ciency e¤ect of a vertical merger will then always dominate the collusive e¤ect
(see the discussion in Subsection 5.2).
8Assume that a unique equilibrium exists for the relevant ranges of ci; and denote
equilibrium prices and pro…ts as
pi(c1;c 2) and ¼i(c1;c 2);i =1 ;2:
In particular, pi(m;m) and pi(m1;m) are given by equation (1). By the symmetry
of the demand functions, we have p1(c1;c 2)=p2(c1;c 2) and ¼1(c1;c 2)=¼2(c1;c 2) if
c1 = c2:
We assume that prices are strategic complements, as in OSS; namely, an increase
in …rm j0s price increases the marginal pro…t of …rm i for i 6= j: If we were to draw
a diagram placing p1 on the horizontal axis and p2 on the vertical axis, the reaction
curves de…ned by equation (1) would be upward slopping, with the one for i =1








That is, an increase in the marginal cost of a downstream …rm increases the prices in
the downstream market.
It then follows, from the envelope theorem, that
@¼i(c1;c 2)
@cj





> 0;i ; j =1 ;2 and i 6= j:
That is, a downstream …rm’s pro…t increases in its rival’s cost.







; i;j;k=1 ;2 and i 6= j: (3)
That is, products are substitutes and demand for a product is more responsive to
its own price change than to the price change of another product.
For illustration, we shall consider a linear-demand example:
9Example 1 Assume qi =1¡ pi + ¯(pj ¡ pi);i ; j=1 ;2; where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a
measure of product di¤erentiation. Then from (1), for i;j =1 ;2 and i 6= j;
pi(c1;c 2)=
2+3 ¯ +2( 1+¯)




(2 + 3¯ ¡ (2 + 4¯ + ¯2)ci +( ¯ + ¯2)cj)
2
(2 + ¯)
2 (2 + 3¯)
2 :
One can verify that both conditions (2) and (3) are satis…ed.
We note that for any given demand functions, both m1 and m ¡ m1 should not be
too large, so that positive output will be produced and e¤ective competition exists
in U. For our linear-demand example, we need m1 < 1 and
m · m1 +( 1¡ m1)
(1 + 2¯)(2+3¯)(3¯2 +6 ¯ +4 )




If no vertical merger occurs at stage 1, competition among the upstream …rms
means that D1 and D2 will purchase from U1 at the equilibrium input price m or from
any upstream …rm if m = m1:12 Thus without vertical merger the equilibrium pro…ts
for D1;D2; and U1 are simply ¼1(m;m);¼ 2(m;m); and (m¡m1)[q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))+
q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))]: Notice that this would be the same outcome if the input
prices announced are spot prices and …rms in D choose suppliers only after down-
stream prices are determined. In other words, without vertical merger, the identity
of suppliers in the upstream market does not matter to a downstream …rm.
The subgame that starts from the vertical merger of D1 and U1 will be solved
using backward induction. We shall …rst characterize equilibrium in the downstream
12Notice that as long as m¡m1 is not too large;U1 will not want to charge a price lower than m:
10market after only D1 and U1 have vertically integrated, then study equilibrium in
the upstream market after that merger, and then consider whether in equilibrium D2
would want to counter the D1=U1 merger by a merger with another upstream …rm.
We shall …nally solve the entire model by considering when there is vertical merger
in equilibrium.
3.1 The Downstream Market with Vertical Merger of D1 and U1
To characterize equilibrium in the downstream market when only D1 and U1 have
merged; there are two possible cases to consider, depending on from whom D2 pur-
chases inputs.
(i) D2 agrees to buy all input from an unintegrated U …rm at price w2.
Let the lowest price o¤ered by U2;:::Uh be w2: Then, if D2 buys from an unin-
tegrated upstream …rm, it will pay w2: In this case, c1 = m1;c 2 = w2; a n di nt h e
downstream market the equilibrium prices for F and D2 are simply p1(m1;w 2)and
p2(m1;w 2); and their pro…ts are simply ¼1(m1;w 2) and ¼2(m1;w 2): Notice that in this
case D2 interacts with F in D but not in U:
(ii) D2 agrees to buy all input from F at price w1:
In this case, c1 = m1 and c2 = w1; but now D2 interacts with F both in D and in
U: Let the pro…t of F be ¼F




1 =( p1 ¡ m1)q1(p1;p 2)+( w1 ¡ m1)q2(p1;p 2);
¼
F
2 =( p2 ¡ w1)q2(p1;p 2):
In equilibrium, pF
1 (m1;w 1) and pF











+ q2(p1;p 2)=0 : (6)
Comparing these conditions with those for p1(¢;¢) and p2(¢;¢) in (1); the crucial
di¤erence is that there is now an extra term, (w1 ¡ m1)
@q2(p1;p2)
@p1 ; that is not present
when D2 purchases from an unintegrated …rm in U: Denote the equilibrium pro…ts
by ¼F
1 (m1;w 1) and ¼F
2 (m1;w 1) in this case.










Comparing the conditions for pF
i (m1;w 1) i n( 5 )a n d( 6 )w i t ht h o s ef o rpi(m1;w 1)
in (1), since
@q2
@p1 > 0 and prices are strategic complements, we have:
Lemma 1 For i =1 ;2;p F
i (m1;w 1) >p i(m1;w 1) if w1 >m 1; and pF
i (m1;w 1)=
pi(m1;w 1) if w1 = m1:
When F sells inputs to D2 at prices higher than marginal cost; i th a sl e s si n c e n t i v e
to cut its price in D; w h i c hi nt u r nr a i s e sb o t hF and D20s prices in D: In terms
of reaction functions (curves), the third term on the left-hand side of (5) shifts to
the right the reaction curve de…ned by equation (1) for i =1 , causing an upward
movement of equilibrium prices. However, if w1 = m1; this e¤ect disappears since the
extra term in (5) is zero. Notice that, in particular, Lemma 1 implies pF
i (m1;m) ¸
pi(m1;m); where the strict inequality holds if and only if m1 <m :
Proposition 1 If w>m 1; then ¼F











> (p2(m1;w) ¡ w)q2(p
F
1 (m1;w);p 2(m1;w)) [by revealed preference]




12Proposition 1 says that, for the same input price w>m 1, D2 obtains higher pro…t
by purchasing from the integrated …rm than from an unintegrated upstream …rm.
This is the key insight behind the theory of vertical mergers in this paper:v e r t i c a l






































We now de…ne w¤







1 exists uniquely since ¼F
2 (m1;w 1) ¸ ¼2(m1;m) when w1 = m; ¼F
2 (m1;w 1) <
¼2(m1;m) when w1 is su¢ciently large, and
@¼F
2 (m1;w1)
@w1 < 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,w¤
1 >mif
m1 <mand w¤
1 = m if m1 = m: We note that the di¤erence between w¤
1 and m will
be small if the di¤erence between m1 and m is small.



























which is positive if the di¤erence between w1 and m1 is not too large: Therefore, if
m1 is close to m; w¤




> 0 for m1 · w1 · w
¤
1; (9)
13which says that, within a certain range, F0s pro…t is higher if D2 purchases input
from F at a higher price. In the rest of the paper, we assume condition (9) holds.
In our linear-demand example, w¤
1 = m+ 1
2¯2 m¡m1
1+2¯ ; and condition (9) holds as long
as condition (4) is satis…ed.
Lemma 3 pF
1 (m1;m) · pF
2 (m1;m) · p1(m;m)=p2(m;m); where the strict inequal-
ities hold if and only if m1 <m :
Proof. pF

















+ q2(p1;p 2)=0 :
If m1 = m; then these conditions would be the same as those for p1(m;m) and
p2(m;m) in condition (1); and we would have pF
i (m1;m)=pi(m;m):




@p1 < 0 from condition (3), we have
(p
F







2 (m1;m)) > 0;
(p
F







2 (m1;m)) = 0:
Comparing these conditions with those for pi(m;m) in condition (1),
we have pF
1 (m1;m) <p F
2 (m1;m) <p 1(m;m)=p2(m;m):
Thus, if m1 <mand a vertical merger does not raise the rival’s cost (w1 = m),i t
would make the downstream market more competitive.
3.2 The Upstream Market with Vertical Merger of D1 and U1
We now study equilibrium in the upstream market when only D1 and U1 have
vertically integrated. We have:
14Proposition 2 In the subgame where F is formed through the merger of D1 and
U1 and no other merger has occurred, the unique equilibrium outcome is that (i) if
m>m 1;D 2 agrees to purchase all of its input from F at price w1 = w¤
1 >m ; and
(ii) if m = m1, D2 will purchase input from either F or an unintegrated upstream
…rm at price m:
Proof. (i) First, by construction, the strategies of F o¤ering w¤
1; all unintegrated
U …rms o¤ering w¤
2 = m,a n dD2 agreeing to purchase from F when ¼F
2 (m1;w 1) ¸
¼2(m1;w 2) constitute an equilibrium of the subgame. Thus what is proposed is an
equilibrium outcome, and w¤
1 >msince m1 <m .
Next, there can be no equilibrium where w1 >w ¤
1: This is because if w1 >w ¤
1;
¼F
2 (m1;w 1) <¼ 2(m1;m); and hence D2 would prefer to purchase from an uninte-
grated U …rm at a price equal to or slightly higher than m; and such a price will
indeed be o¤ered: But then F can increase its pro…t by o¤ering w1 at slightly below
w¤
1 to sell to D2: Similarly, there can be no equilibrium where w1 <w ¤
1; since F can
increase its pro…t by rasing w1 to w¤
1:
Finally, there can be no equilibrium if D20s behavior is such that it purchases from
an unintegrated U …rm when ¼F
2 (m1;w 1)=¼2(m1;m): Thus other possible equilibria
can di¤er from the proposed one only in that one or several unintegrated U …rms may
o¤er w2 >m :But the equilibrium outcome is always for F to o¤er w¤
1 and D2 to
accept F 0s o¤er:
(ii) If m = m1; then w¤
1 = m and ¼F
2 (m1;m)=¼2(m1;m): In this case, it is an
equilibrium for F and unintegrated U …rms to o¤er m and for D2 to accept an o¤er
from either F or an unintegrated upstream …rm. For similar arguments as in (i),
at any equilibrium at least two upstream producers, including possibly F; must o¤er
w2 = m (or w1 = m)to D2: Hence the proposed is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Therefore, if m>m 1;Fwill charge D2 an input price that is high enough to leave
D2 just indi¤erent between purchasing from F at w¤
1 >mor from an independent
15upstream …rm at m: But if m = m1;Fwill not be able to sell to D2 at w1 >m :
3.3 Will There Be Any Counter-merger if D1 and U1 merge?
If D2 counters the merger of D1 and U1 b yam e r g e ro fi t so w nw i t ha nu p s t r e a m
…rm, say U2; the combined pro…t of D2 and U2 would be ¼2(m1;m).B u t s i n c e
¼F
2 (m1;w¤
1)=¼2(m1;m);D 2 and U2 cannot bene…t from the merger. Therefore, in
equilibrium, there will be no counter-merger if D1 and U1 merge.
3.4 Equilibrium Vertical Merger
After a vertical merger by a downstream …rm with U1; the unintegrated down-
stream …rm will receive ¼2(m1;m): Competition between the downstream …rms imply
that D1 will need to pay ¼F
1 (m1;w ¤
1)¡¼2(m1;m) in order to acquire U1:Since without
the merger U1 can obtain (m¡m1)[q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))],
we have:





1) >¼ 2(m1;m)+(m¡m1)[q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))]:
We now state our main result:
Theorem 1 There is vertical merger in equilibrium if and only if m1 <m :





1) ¡ [¼2(m1;m)+( m ¡ m1)(q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)))]
= ¼
F
1 (m;m) ¡ ¼2(m;m)=¼1(m;m) ¡ ¼2(m;m)=0 :
Hence, from Lemma 4 above, there is no vertical merger if m = m1: We thus only
need to show there is vertical merger if m1 <m :We proceed as follows.
16Step 1: Notice ¼F
1 (m1;w¤
1) >¼ F
1 (m1;m) due to w¤








































2 (m1;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p
F
2 (m1;m))


















@p2 < 0 and pF
















> (p2(m1;m) ¡ m)q1(p2(m1;m);p
F









> (p2(m1;m) ¡ m)q1(p2(m1;m);p 1(m1;m)) [since p1(m1;m) <p
F
2 (m1;m)]
+(m ¡ m1)[q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))]: [from Steps 2 and 3]
Our conclusion then follows from
(p2(m1;m) ¡ m)q1(p2(m1;m);p 1(m1;m))
=( p2(m1;m) ¡ m)q2(p1(m1;m);p 2(m1;m)) = ¼2(m1;m)
17and Lemma 4:
4. THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS
Proposition 3 A vertical merger of D1 with U1 raises the input price and reduces
the market share of D2: It also reduces the pro…t of D2:
Proof. First, since a merger of D1 and U1 occurs only if m>m 1; and since w¤
1 >m
























q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) = q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)):


































< (p2(m;m) ¡ m)q2 (p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) = ¼2(m;m);
where the last two inequalities are due to pF
1 (m1;m) <p 1(m;m) and D20s revealed
preference.
Therefore, although it will purchase inputs from F given that D1 and U1 have
merged, D2 would prefer that no merger has occurred since its pro…t is reduced by
the merger.
As in OSS and other models of vertical foreclosure, a vertical merger in our theory
also raises a rival’s input price and reduces its market share. In this sense there is
also equilibrium vertical foreclosure. But this happens for a reason that has not been
18identi…ed in the literature: vertical integration changes the rival …rm’s incentive to
select input supplier and motivates it to purchase from the integrated …rm even at
prices higher than those o¤ered by unintegrated suppliers. This in turn softens price
competition in the …nal market and tends to make vertical integration anticompeti-
tive. We shall call this the foreclosure or collusive e¤ect of vertical mergers.
While it will have a collusive e¤ect, a vertical merger in our model can occur if
and only if it yields certain e¢ciency gain (m1 <m ): either the downstream …rm
integrates a more e¢cient upstream producer and eliminates the ine¢ciency from
double markup, or the vertical merger improves e¢ciency in the production of inputs.
In either case, the integrated …rm will face a lower marginal cost in producing the
…nal good. This in turn intensi…es price competition in the …nal market and tends
to make vertical integration procompetitive. We shall call this the e¢ciency e¤ect of
vertical mergers.
One may think that, because of the collusive e¤ect when F sells to D2 at w1 >m 1;
F should be able to sell to D2 at some w1 slightly higher than m even if m1 = m:
To see why this is false, notice that when D2 purchases from F at w1 >minstead
of from U2 at w2 = m; although D2 bene…ts from F0s higher downstream price, it
su¤ers from its own increased input cost. When m1 = m; the direct e¤ect of cost
increase will outweigh the strategic e¤ect of softening competition, and as a result
D2 will not buy from F if w1 >m :This can be seen most clearly from the fact that
¼F
2 (m1;m)=¼2(m1;m) when m1 = m and ¼F
2 (m1;w 1) decreases in w1:
Whether a vertical merger will be pro- or anti-competitive thus depends on the
balance of its collusive and e¢ciency e¤ects. Interestingly, the simple and familiar
measure regarding the degree of product di¤erentiation,
@q2








@p1 is su¢ciently small, vertical merger lowers







19large, vertical merger raises prices in D and thus harms consumers.
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@p1 is su¢ciently close to zero, w¤
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On the other hand, if
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@p1 is large enough to be close to ¡
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Thus, while vertical merger harms the integrated …rm’s competitor, it may or may
not harm competition. When …rms in the downstream market are close competitors
20(produce close substitutes), the collusive e¤ect tends to dominate and the vertical
merger tends to be anticompetitive; while if products are highly di¤erentiated, the
e¢ciency e¤ect tends to dominate and vertical merger tends to be procompetitive.
In our linear-demand example, vertical merger lowers …nal prices if ¯<0:74827;
a n di tr a i s e s… n a lp r i c e si f¯>1:8414:When 0:74827 <¯<1:8414; the merger lowers
the …nal price for product 1 but raises the …nal price for product 2.
The new theories of vertical foreclosure have mainly focused on the anticompetitive
e¤ects of vertical mergers. As such, they are inadequate in providing guidance for
evaluating the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. Recently, Riordan (1998) has
developed an interesting model where vertical integration can have both e¢ciency
and foreclosure e¤ects, and his analysis yields a clear policy message suggesting that
on balance vertical merger is anticompetitive. However, Riordan’s analysis is based
on and applies only to situations where there is a dominant …rm in the downstream
market. Our results here provide clear policy implications for vertical mergers when
the downstream market is oligopoly.13
5. DISCUSSION
We now consider several possible changes to the model to gain insights on the
robustness of our results.
5.1 Quantity Competition
Suppose that everything is the same as before except that the downstream market
is characterized by a homogeneous product and quantity competition. Suppose that
13Riordan also …nds that vertical integration by a dominant …rm may or may not reduce social
welfare. Our analysis has focused on the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. It appears also true
here that a vertical merger may raise or lower welfare, but a detailed analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper.
21the (inverse) market demand in D is P(q1+q2); where q1 and q2 are the output choices
of D1 (or F) and D2: As before, when D is considered in isolation, let qi(c1;c 2) and
¼i(c1;c 2) be Di0s equilibrium output and pro…t under constant marginal cost ci; and,
when D1 and U1 have vertically integrated, the pro…ts of F and D2 are
¼
F
1 = q1 [P(q1 + q2) ¡ m1]+( w1 ¡ m1)q2;
¼
F
2 = q2 [P(q1 + q2) ¡ w1]:
If F competes with D2 in Cournot fashion, then since q2 is taken as given when F
chooses its output in D; in equilibrium qF
1 (m1;w 1) and qF































But these are the same equilibrium conditions if D2 purchases from an unintegrated
upstream …rm at w2 = w1: Therefore it is optimal for D2 to purchase the input at the
lowest price regardless of the identity of the supplier, and the equilibrium input price
for D2 will always be m: By standard results under Cournot competition, in equi-
librium, ¼F
2 (m1;m)=¼2(m1;m);q F
2 (m1;m)=q2(m1;m) · q2(m;m) · q1(m1;m)=
qF
1 (m1;m); and q1(m;m)+q2(m;m) · qF
1 (m1;m)+qF
2 (m1;m); where the inequalities











2 (m1;m)) ¡ m1
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2 (m1;m)) ¡ m
´
+( m ¡ m1)[q1(m;m)+q2(m;m)]
= ¼
F
2 (m1;m)+( m ¡ m1)[q1(m;m)+q2(m;m)];
where the inequality holds strictly if and only if m1 <m :Thus, from Lemma 4, there











2 (m1;m)) ¡ m
´
22<q 2(m;m)(P(q1(m;m)+q2(m;m)) ¡ m)=¼2(m;m):
We therefore have:
Remark 1 If our model is changed so that in the downstream market there is a
homogeneous product and …rms are Cournot competitors, then it continues to be true
that there is equilibrium vertical merger if and only if m1 <m ;a n di ta l s oc o n t i n u e s
to be true that the vertical merger reduces the downstream rival’s market share and
its pro…t. However, here the vertical merger always bene…ts consumers.
The collusive e¤ect does not arise in the Cournot model, since F does not take into
account that its more aggressive action in D may reduce D20s output and its purchase
of input from F: However, if one believes that an integrated …rm would realize that
its strategic actions in the downstream market could a¤ect its pro…t in the upstream
market, then the Cournot model would seem inappropriate.
Even with quantity competition, if we allow F (and D1) to be a Stackelberg leader
in D; then F would incorporate the e¤ect of its strategic action in D on its pro…t in
U; and the collusive e¤ect of vertical merger can again arise. I shall spare the readers
from the details of this case, but the intuition is fairly straightforward. When D2
purchases the input from F w h oi saS t a c k e l b e r gl e a d e ri nD; F will be less aggressive
in setting its output in D because it realizes that its higher output would reduce D20s
output and hence D20s purchase of input: This would then motivate D2 to choose F
as its supplier even if F 0s price is slightly higher than those of unintegrated suppliers,
provided m1 <m .
Therefore, the main result of our analysis, that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium
if and only if there is an e¢ciency gain, holds under quantity competition as well.
It also becomes clear that whether a vertical merger will lead to higher costs for
rivals and collusive behavior depends crucially on whether the integrated …rm will
take its rival’s output as given in making its strategic decisions in the downstream
23market. This explains why a vertical merger has a collusive e¤ect under Bertrand or
Stackelberg competition, but not in the Cournot model.
5.2 No Contracting or No Discrimination in the Upstream market
An important assumption of our model is that a downstream …rm, before setting its
output price, can contract with an upstream supplier to purchase all required input at
the contract price. It would thus be interesting to know what happens to our result if
such contracting is not possible and only spot transaction in the upstream market is
allowed. Suppose that at Stage 3, any upstream producer (including possibly F)c a n
only announce the prices it will supply any independent downstream …rm, but they
cannot enter into any agreement specifying who would supply a downstream …rm.
That is, the downstream …rm(s) decide from whom to purchase input only after the
downstream prices are set. Then in equilibrium F will set w1 = m in order to sell to




1 (m1;m) >¼ 2(m1;m)+(m¡m1)[q1(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m)) + q2(p1(m;m);p 2(m;m))]
if m1 <m :From Lemma 3, ¼F
1 (m1;m)=¼1(m1;m)=¼2(m1;m) if m1 = m: This
together with Lemma 4 implies that there is vertical merger in equilibrium if and
only if m1 <m :That is, Theorem 1 continues to hold in this case. However, since
pF
1 (m1;m) <p F
2 (m1;m) <p 1(m;m)=p2(m;m) if m1 <mfrom Lemma 3, in this
case the vertical merger always bene…ts consumers.
Another possible change to our model, which has the same e¤ect to our analysis as
allowing no contracting in the upstream market, is to assume that no discrimination
14Since the downstream prices are already set, D2 will simply purchase input from the seller with
the lower price. D2would be indi¤erent between purchasing from F or U2 at price m; but the only
strategy of D2 that is consistent with equilibrium is for it to purchase from F if m1 <m :
24is allowed in the upstream market. Suppose that a downstream …rm is required by
law to purchase input from any supplier with the lowest price.15 Then in equilibrium
F will also set w1 = m in order to sell to D2; and D2will indeed purchase from F
if m1 <m :Therefore, the results concerning equilibrium vertical mergers and their
competitive e¤ects in this case will be the same as those when no contracting is
allowed. We therefore have:
Remark 2 If only spot transaction is allowed in the upstream market, or if …rms
in D are required by law to purchase from lowest price supplier, then Theorem 1
continues to hold; i..e., there is vertical merger in equilibrium if and only if m1 <m :
However, in this case the e¢ciency e¤ect of vertical mergers dominates the collusive
e¤ect and vertical mergers bene…t consumers.
In equilibrium, D2 will purchase input from F at w1 = m and the …nal prices are
higher than they would be if D2 purchased from an unintegrated U …rm at the same
input price; because F 0s concern for its upstream pro…t softens competition in the
downstream market. In this sense, the collusive e¤ect of vertical merger still exists.
But the …nal prices are lower than they would be had no vertical merger occurred,
due to the dominating e¢ciency e¤ect.
Therefore, even if no contracting or no discrimination is allowed in the upstream
market, the main result of our analysis is still valid, to the extent described in Remark
2. However, when requirement contracts can be used and downstream …rms do not
have to purchase from the lowest price supplier, a vertical merger can raise the rival’s
cost and be anticompetitive. Notice that vertical merger still plays a key role in
causing the anticompetitive e¤ects, since without it the same type of requirement
15One may wonder whether such legal requirement is enforcable, considering that contracted prices
may not be observable and in real situations the inputs provided by di¤erent producers may not be
identical.
25contracts or allowing discrimination in the upstream market would have no impact
on equilibrium prices in both the upstream and downstream markets.
5.3 Allowing Other Contract Forms
We now change the model to consider alternative contract forms that can be used
at stage 3. We shall consider two-part tari¤ contracts that may or may not be
requirement contracts.
If parties can enter into a two-part tari¤ requirement contract that allows transfer
payments from the seller to the buyer, then it is possible that U1 could reach collusive
outcome with D1 and D2 by making a transfer payment to them and in exchange
require them to purchase input from it at some optimally chosen price w>m :This
may then maximize the joint pro…ts of upstream and downstream industries. In this
case, there would be no need for vertical integration. However, such a contract is
essentially for an upstream …rm to use an explicit transfer payment to “bribe” a
downstream …rm to purchase from it at an in‡ated price, and it seems questionable
whether such contracts are feasible in practice.
If parties can enter into a two-part tari¤ requirement contract, but the upstream
…rm (the seller) cannot make explicit transfer payments to the downstream …rm (the
buyer), then we have the usual form of two-part tari¤ contracts, where the buyer
pays a …xed fee, T ¸ 0; together with a unit price w; except that here there is also
the additional agreement that the buyer will purchase all input from the seller. In
this case, in equilibrium we will have T =0 ; and all the results of our model will
remain the same. This is because if (w0;T0) is an equilibrium contract between a …rm
producing in U and a …rm in D; where T 0 > 0;the joint pro…ts of the contracting
parties can be increased without making either party worse o¤ if T is reduced to zero
with a proper increase in w:
If the contracts available are two-part tari¤ contracts, without required purchases,
26then the equilibrium outcome will be the same as if the upstream market is a spot
market with linear price and the downstream …rms choose suppliers after the down-
stream prices are set (T =0in this case). The analysis in Section 5.2 then applies,
and our main result holds to the extent described in Remark 2.
To summarize, we have:
Remark 3 Assume that any input supplier is not allowed to make explicit transfer
payments to its customer(s). Then, our analysis is not changed by the use of two-part
tari¤ contracts: when the two-part tari¤ contracts can also be requirement contracts,
all results of our model will hold; and when the two-part tari¤ contracts are not allowed
to be requirement contracts, our results will be the same as those stated in Remark 2.
5.4 Comparing to Horizontal Mergers
There are obvious similarities between our model of vertical mergers and models of
horizontal mergers. Our result that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium if and only if
there are e¢ciency gains is closely related to the results in Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
and Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), where equilibrium horizontal mergers can
occur only if there are e¢ciency gains. The results in these two papers, however,
depend on there being Cournot competition, and as Davidson and Deneckere (1985)
has shown, with Bertrand competition no e¢ciency gain is needed to cause a hori-
zontal merger. The result in our model is stronger in the sense that it holds for both
Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Our result that vertical mergers tend to have both collusive and e¢ciency e¤ects
is closely related to the result in the literature that horizontal mergers often have
these two e¤ects. The competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers therefore involve some-
what similar trade-o¤s to those in horizontal mergers. Vertical mergers tend to be
procompetitive when the downstream …rms’ products are highly di¤erentiated but
27anticompetitive when they are close substitutes. This …nding is parallel to the results
in the horizontal merger literature regarding how the competitive e¤ects of horizontal
mergers may depend on product di¤erentiation, which is re‡ected in the evaluation
of horizontal mergers by the U.S. Department of Justice and FTC (see in particular
Section 2.21 in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines by the Justice Department and
FTC).
6. CONCLUSION
The new theories of vertical mergers have o¤ered the important insight that vertical
integration changes an upstream producer’s incentive to supply the integrated …rm’s
downstream rivals. This paper suggests that vertical integration also changes the
rivals’ incentive to choose input suppliers. With this new insight, we have developed
an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers, incorporating the strategic behaviors in the
upstream market of both the integrated …rm and its downstream rivals. Our main
result has a very simple form: Under fairly general conditions, equilibrium vertical
mergers occur if and only if m1 <m :This result in turn implies that vertical mergers
will generally lead to both an e¢ciency gain and collusive behavior in horizontal
competition. We also …nd that there is a simple and familiar measure, namely the
degree of production di¤erentiation in the downstream market, that can be used to
evaluate whether a vertical merger is likely to bene…t or harm consumers.
In our theory, a vertical merger can raise downstream rivals’ cost, not because
the rivals are excluded from input suppliers, but because the merger changes rivals’
incentive in selecting input suppliers. A vertical merger creates the opportunity for
multimarket interdependence between competitors in the downstream market, and
will thus have a collusive e¤ect.16 However, this collusive e¤ect can be realized if and
16The idea that multimarket contacts may facilitate collusion has long been known in economics,
and has been formally modeled in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) in the context of repeated inter-
28only if the vertical merger also has an e¢ciency e¤ect that occurs due to lowered
marginal cost of the integrated …rm in producing the …nal product. It is generally
believed in the literature that a …rm can obtain competitive advantage either by
cutting its own cost or by raising rivals’ cost, and only the latter type of strategies
is considered anticompetitive (Klass and Salinger, 1995). Our analysis suggests that
these two strategies may be intrinsically related in some situations: a …rm can raise
rivals’ cost through vertical integration if and only if its own cost is reduced through
the integration.
There are other approaches to the study of vertical integration. One is based on
the notion of incomplete contracts, as in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Tirole
(1990), and Williamson (1985). Another approach has focused more on problems
of asymmetric information, as in Arrow (1975) and Gal-Or (1999). Our focus on
horizontal competition and vertical merger is complementary to these alternative ap-
proaches. The idea that vertical integration changes both the integrated …rm and
its rivals’ strategic incentives may have broader implications than for the theory of
vertical mergers developed in this paper. It may also help us understand more gen-
erally how horizontal competition a¤ects and is a¤ected by the vertical organization
of industries. This remains an interesting area for future research.
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